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ANTITRUST POLICY: CHALLENGE AND DEFENSE
JESSE W. MARKHAM*

INTRODUCTION

In view of its age, durability and continuous public assessment one
would surely think that our antitrust policy would by now have settled
down to that state of quiet acceptance customarily accorded such revered
institutions as motherhood, freedom of speech, and-to use Galbraith's
analogies-truth, regular bathing and better traffic control.'
The longevity and durability of antitrust scarcely require comment:
the Sherman Act entered its eightieth year on July 2, 1970, and the
Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts are each approaching their
sixtieth anniversary. As a national policy, therefore, the basic principles of
antitrust antedate the Federal Reserve System, the federal income tax, and
all the familiar federal regulatory bodies with the single exception of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Moreover, the statutory language
setting forth the essential purposes of the policy has undergone
remarkably little change since those purposes were elaborated and made
more specific in the 1914 acts. The Robinson-Patman Act (1936) simply
gave renewed emphasis to Congress' intent to arrest discriminatory
pricing and corporate mergers already expressed in the original Clayton
Act Sections 2 and 7; the 1950 amendment, of course, also extended
Section 7 to cover asset as well as stock acquisitions.
It is obviously not to be inferred from the above that antitrust policy
of the 1970's is, in all its administrative and adjudicatory aspects,
essentially the antitrust policy of fifty years ago. Even a casual

3
comparison of the early United States Steel' and the 1948 Columbia Steel

decisions with those handed down by the courts in the more recent
*Professor, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. A.B., University of
Richmond, 1941; M.A. 1947, Ph.D. 1949, Harvard University.
'Hearingson Planning,Regulation and Competition Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., ist Sess., at 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Planning,Regulation and Competition].
'United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
3

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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Bethlehem- Youngstown,4 Brown Shoe, 5 Philadelphia National Bank,,
Schlitz, 7 Von's Grocery8 and Grinnell' cases leads to the inescapable
conclusion that antitrust policy is now administered more vigorously, and
more rigorously, than it once was, especially toward mergers and
acquisitions, but toward ancillary restraints as well. As a consequence, it
has become equally clear that business practices the statutes now severely
constrain once passed muster under those same statutes. 0 But it should be
emphasized that what has come to be called the "new" antitrust policy
finds its origin largely in the basic principles laid down in old statutes. As
Chief Justice Hughes observed nearly forty years ago:
As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions
which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or through
particularization defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for
escape."
This "generality and adaptability" of the basic antitrust laws, rather
than any sweeping change in legislative language, accounts for the
increased vigor of antitrust policy. As the economic theories of oligopoly
and imperfect competition"2 produced new hypotheses concerning the
probable relationships between market structure and business behavior,
they provided enlarged and more sophisticated definitions of such terms as
"monopoly," "monopolizing," "tendency toward monopoly" and
"substantial lessening of competition," the familiar standards of legality
set forth in the early antitrust statutes. Meanwhile, however, the antitrust
laws as expressions of our basic economic policy toward the market
economy have remained essentially unaltered.
That the basic antitrust statutes have endured for over a half-century
without significant revision in form is all the more impressive when viewed
in the light of the spectacular changes which have occurred in the "market
economy" to which they are addressed. The first corporation with as
much as $1 billion in assets was not formed until 1901 (the United States
'United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
'United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
'United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
"8Cf Markham, Antitrust Trends and New Constraints,HARV. Bus. REv., May-June
1963, at 84.
"Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
'2Cf. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1st ed. 1933); J.
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
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Steel Corporations); the 1970 Fortune list 13 of the five hundred largest
industrial corporations contains 105 such companies having assets in
excess of $1 billion-thirteen of which have assets in excess of $5 billion.
As large corporations have grown in size and multiplied they have also
become vastly more complex and diverse. According to the Federal Trade
Commission's recent report, 181 of the largest two hundred
manufacturing corporations operate in at least ten distinguishable
product markets;" and other sources reveal that 187 of Fortune's largest
five hundred now qualify as multinational corporations. 5
Obviously, such modern complex corporations compete by different
and more sophisticated means than their less complex predecessors. While
these differences in competitive methods scarcely require documentation
or elaboration, a few statistics on advertising and research and
development serve as a rough measure of the extent to which the
competitive environment has changed: between 1930 and 1968 business
expenditures on research and development increased from slightly over
$100 million to $7 billion, most of which was spent on new product
development.' Between 1935 and 1969 total advertising expenditures by
business increased from $1.7 billion to $20.5 billion, of which nearly $3
billion were spent on television, a competitive advertising medium not
I7
used by business until 1949.
The increased size and complexity of corporate enterprise and the
concurrent changes in its competitive environment are the generative
forces behind the current antitrust controversy. On the one hand, there are
those who hold that the onrush of these forces has rendered antitrust
policy inapplicable-possibly even inimical-to the modern market
economy. The therapy prescribed, sometimes explicitly but more often by
implication, ranges from tailoring antitrust policy to the "new" market
economy to virtually discarding the policy altogether in favor of a more
appropriate instrument of public regulation. On the other hand, there are
those who contend that effective public policy lies not in accepting these
" Compiled from iHE FORTUNE DIRECTORY OF THE 500 LARGEST CORPORATIONS
(1970).
"Staff study entitled "Economic Report on Corporate Mergers" by the Bureau of
Economics of the Federal Trade Commission in Hearings on Economic Concentration
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8A at 224 (1969).
SA multinational corporation is defined as one that operates production facilities in at
least six countries. J.VAUPEL & J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

(1969).
"Adapted from periodic reports of the National Science Foundation and from E.
MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 452 (1970).
9. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 178 (1967); ADVERTISING AGE, March
30, 1970, at 47-48.
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forces as immutable, but in the premise that they are containable, even
reversible, through a radically revised antitrust policy. While they
prescribe vastly different remedies, both contemplate radical change in
traditional antitrust.

II.

THE CHALLENGE

It may be appropriate at the outset to stress a point obvious to all
students of antitrust policy: controversy over certain of its aspects is not of
recent origin. The early landmark Sherman Act decisions, and especially
the Standard Oil18 decision, precipitated lengthy and often heated debate
19
over the relative merits of the "rule of reason" and "reasonable rules"
as appropriate antitrust standards-a debate that apparently has not yet
entirely subsided. Spokesmen from the business community have
complained that the laws were painfully vague or, alternatively, that they
were painfully precise. In general, antitrust lawyers have voiced their
preference for a policy erected more squarely on rules while economists
have urged greater reliance on economic analysis.21 Nevertheless, it can
fairly be said that the antitrust controversy, until very recently, centered
more on procedure and method than on substance. Few would register
strong disagreement with George Stocking's summary assessment of the
situation in 1955 when he wrote:
The postwar period has revealed little disposition by any influential
group to abandon the principles of the antitrust laws. It has,
2
however, sparked a movement for their modification. '
The distinguishing feature of the current antitrust challenge is that it
emanates in increasing numbers from those who come perilously close to
urging abandonment of the principles of antitrust altogether. By far the
most elegant and, if assessed solely in terms of the limited economic
evidence offered to sustain it, the most persuasive case for their
abandonment is made by John K. Galbraith in his The New Industrial
State.22 However, Galbraith had several illustrious intellectual forebears.
David Lilienthal, first in his 1952 article z3 and shortly thereafter in his
'"Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
"The contrasting terms are those of Kingman Brewster. Brewster, Enforceable
Competition, Untruly Reason or ReasonableRules?, AM. ECON. REV., May 1956, at 482.
"'Cf.Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937).
21
Stocking, The Attorney General's Committee's Report: The Businessman's Guide
Through Antitrust, 44 GEo. L.J. 1, 3 (1955).
2J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE]; see especially 184-97. A summary of Galbraith's position appears in
Planning,Regulation and Competition at 4-11.

"Lilienthal, Our Antitrust Laws are CripplingAmerica, COLLIER'S, May 31, 1952, at
15-17, 74-75.
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book Big Business: A New Era,2 lauded the giant corporation as our
nation's greatest asset and urged that its performance be judged not in
terms of traditional indicia of competition but in terms of its great
capacity for research, for creating national markets, promoting national
defense, and for giving its employees greater security and vastly improved
wages and working conditions. Our antitrust laws, erected on the
outmoded principle of maintaining market competition, were irrelevant to
the functioning of the modern corporate economy and served only to
hamper industrial progress.
The late A.A. Berle in his The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution' s

rendered a diagnosis of the corporate economy closely akin to that of
Lilienthal's. Modern markets, he argued, were typically concentrated in
the hands of a few giant corporations-the "Big Two," the "Big Three"
or at most the "Big Five"-possessing enormous power. As evidence, he
pointed out that about two hundred of these "concentrates" own outright
slightly more than half of the nation's total industrial assets. Moreover, he
argued, the power of concentrates extends far beyond the simple
arithmetic of property actually owned. 2 6 For example, the so-called
"small" businesses who either supply the large automobile manufacturers
or hold agency contracts to distribute their automobiles may be nominally
independent, "[b]ut their policies, operations, and, in large measure, their
prices, are determined by the [giant automobile companies]." z Clearly,
Berle argued, such concentrates do not, as conventional economic theory
would have it, respond to the forces of supply and demand of the market;
instead they control the market. Further, they have evolved to the point of
escaping the powerful controlling factor of the "judgement of the market
place" in the capital markets, a control on which conventional economic
theory places such heavy reliance. Citing a study made by economists for
the National City Bank, 28 Berle found that of the $150 billion
corporations spent on capital formation in the period 1946-1953,
"[pirobably not more than $5 billion

. . .

was represented by common

stock-the one situation in which an investor considers an
enterprise. . .and puts down his savings, aware of a degree of risk but
hoping for large profit."' ' In contrast, sixty-four per cent came from
internal sources, twelve per cent from bank borrowing, twelve per cent
from the issuance of bonds and notes (half of which was privately placed),
and the rest from preferred and other special stock flotations, none of
2

1D.

LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS:

A NEw

ERA

(1953).

21A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
2

1d. at 27.

at 27-28.
at 37-38.
21
1d. at 39.
2Jd.
2Id.

(1954).
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which, in Berle's view, was clearly tested in the competitive capital market
place.
The implication of Berle's thesis is that modern corporate
concentrates have, in the process of rendering the conventional theory of
competitive market behavior obsolete, made antitrust policy an
ineffectual and inappropriate instrument of public control. What means,
then, are available for containing the awesome power the capitalist
revolution has placed in the hands of corporate concentrates? Berle's
review of the history of western economies prompts him to observe that
frequently a solution has been sought in statism, but with results that
scarcely recommend it as a promising alternative. In any case, however,
the final resolution of the problem is political rather than economic;
meanwhile, we must rely upon those ad hoc instruments of control we
already have; namely, the forces of public opinion, a subdued and limited
form of oligopolistic rivalry, and the potential threat of direct government
intervention. Antitrust policy, it should be noted, is not even assigned a
supporting role.
Galbraith, while relying heavily on essentially the same economic facts
that underlie Berle's thesis, erects a much more elaborate analysis, and
one from which he adduces a more devastating attack on antitrust policy.
As did Lilienthal and Berle, he begins with the evidence that American
business has become very big:
In 1962, the five largest industrial corporations "in the United
States, with combined assets in excess of $36 billion, possessed
over 12 percent of all assets used in manufacturing. The 50 largest
corporations had over a third . . . . The 500 largest corporations
had well over two-thirds . . . . In the mid-1950's, 28 corporations
provided approximately 10 percent of all employment in
manufacturing, mining, and retail and wholesale trade. In the first
half of that decade . . . a hundred firms received two-thirds by
value of all defense contracts; . . . . In 1960 four corporations
accounted for an estimated 22 percent of all industrial research and
development. . . . [T]hree hundred and eighty-four corporations
employing 5,000 or more workers accounted for 85 percent of these
research and development expenditures . . . . [I]n 1965, three
industrial corporations, General Motors, Standard Oil of New
Jersey, and Ford Motor Co., had more gross income than all of the
farms in the country."
The facts cited, while they emphasize the dramatic at some sacrifice in
detail and pertinence, are sufficient to establish Galbraith's essential
point: some corporations are very large, are much larger than most
38PIanning,Regulation and Competition at 5-6.
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corporations and, at least in absolute terms, are much larger than the
largest corporations of earlier eras.
The largest contemporary corporation, continuing with Galbraith's
analysis, possesses enormous power. It has power over the prices it
charges and over the prices and wages it pays. Moreover, as Berle had
argued earlier, it has, by virtue of its reliance on retained earnings for
three-quarters of its capital needs, exempted itself from dependency on the
capital market. Accordingly, large corporate enterprise has usurped the
sovereignty that once resided in the consumer, liberated itself from the
constraining forces of the market, and emancipated itself from the control
of stockholders. In short, it no longer is governed by the economic forces
of the market place; it manages the market place.
Galbraith is, of course, not the first to argue-erroneously, as I shall
show later-that business size is synonymous with market power.31 The
novelty of his analysis, which depends on equating these virtually
unrelated aspects of the market economy, is that it provides a rationale for
equating the two. To conduct large corporate ventures, Galbraith
contends, is to incur enormous expenditures. The developmental and
capital costs of launching a new product, e.g., the Ford Motor Company
bringing out the Mustang, 32 often requires a commitment of hundreds of
millions of dollars. Not even the contemporary large corporation could
long afford to entrust the success of such costly ventures to the vagaries of
the market. Accordingly, a prerequisite to launching them is the prior
assurance of their success. Corporate enterprise, through massive
advertising, obtains this assurance; it can plan because it manages the
market place; and it can manage the market place because in an affluent
society consumers buy not what they pressingly need but what they can be
persuaded they want. As Galbraith puts it:
No hungry man who is also sober can be persuaded to use his last
dollar for anything but food. But a well-fed, well-clad, wellsheltered and otherwise well-tended person can be persuaded as
between an electric razor and an electric toothbrush. Along with
prices and costs, consumer demand becomes subject to
management.?
In such an organized and planned industrial state antitrust, to use
Galbraith's term, is a charade. It is a generally accepted proposition, he
reminds us, that it is vastly more difficult to break up existing bigness or
3

'Cf. Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS
331-59 (1955).
377HE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE at 11-12. Styling and tooling costs alone amounted to
$59 million.
1Id. at 4-5.
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
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market power under the antitrust laws than it is to prevent small and
medium-size firms in possession of neither from attaining them. Large
firms therefore need not fear the present intensified battle the antitrust
agencies are waging against mergers-they will not be demerged. On the
contrary, the antimerger battle as a practical matter is being waged
against the medium-size firms who wish to unite in order to deal more
effectively with the giants. Similarly, when firms are large and have few
rivals they are able to establish prices and related terms of trade
satisfactory to all without collusion. They do this simply by practicing the
artful but not too difficult sport economists define as conjectural
interdependence or, to use the lawyer's equivalent phrase, conscious
parallelism.3 But when there are twenty or so firms in an industry the
attainment of a mutually satisfactory price can be achieved only by
meeting together or by exchanging information on such matters as prices
and costs. This, however, is unlawful, as is evidenced by the fact that it is
an everyday object of prosecution by the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division.3
Galbraith argues that all this is generally agreed upon, the only
novelty in his own particular assessment is that he draws the disagreeable
conclusion flowing from the agreement: "The antitrust laws give the
impression of protecting the market and competition by attacking those
who exercise it most effectively. . . . There is no escaping the conclusion
that the antitrust laws, so far from being a threat to big business are a
facade behind which it operates with yet greater impunity." 36 This, then, is
the charade, and the situation is not remediable through the all-out attack
on market power adumbrated in the writings of those who favor it. Such
an onslaught would be tantamount to declaring the heartland of the
modern economy illegal. Galbraith concedes that it would be quixotic to
urge the obvious and call for a repeal of the antitrust laws-they are a part
of American folklore-although other industrial countries function quite
competently without them. As for himself, he would be content if we
withdraw our faith from them and let them slowly atrophy.3 7 The resulting
policy void could effectively be filled, again as other industrial countries
have filled it, with some form of publicly administered price and wage
38
controls .
I have gone to some pains in providing the essential details of
Galbraith's challenge of antitrust policy because he not only develops
31Cf. Markham, Oligopoly in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
283-90 (1968).
35E.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).

SCIENCES

-Planning, Regulationand Competition at 9-10.
3id. at 11.

3'Professor Galbraith has urged the adoption of such controls in his recent television
appearances. But see THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 190-9 1.
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virtually all the salient arguments made by others identified with his
general appraisal, he develops them more clearly and in a far more telling
fashion. However, two arguments others have made and on which
Galbraith did not dwell-in his own sweeping indictment of antitrust
policy they would, at best, have been trivial-merit brief comment. Our
antitrust policy is an obstacle (1)
to the smooth and efficient functioning
of our multinational corporations in foreign and international markets 9
and (2) to those cooperative arrangements which would contribute to
increased productivity at home. 0 The major thrust of the first of these
arguments is that while our antitrust laws have remained essentially
unchanged for decades, extensive quantitative and qualitative changes
have occurred in both the methods and environment of international
business. As the gap widens between the law and certain aspects of the
economic system to which it is addressed, the law needs to be overhauled.
The second of the two arguments derives from what most industrialized
countries call "rationalization" agreements; that is, agreements among
firms are generally held to be permissible if the parties involved can show
that they may increase productivity or have other such desirable
consequences. In view of the lagging productivity of the United States
economy in recent years, made more serious by predictions that it is not
likely to rise substantially in the foreseeable future, it is argued that our
antitrust laws should be relaxed sufficiently to permit industry committees
preoccupied with productivity to function. Presumably, the relaxation
would consist of exempting such intra-industry agreements from
prosecution under the Sherman Act which, as interpreted historically by
the courts, makes such agreements per se illegal. And since it is
extraordinarily difficult to ascertain where collective action on
productivity leaves off and that on such important market matters as
price and output begins, the recommended relaxation would constitute a
substantial break with an antitrust doctrine that has endured almost
without interruption for nearly three-quarters of a century." Precisely
what sort of overhaul would be required to make the antitrust laws more
attuned to the new international economy is not clear, nor is it made clear
by those who urge that it is necessary. However, it may reasonably be
inferred that an overhaul contemplates considerably more than modest or
incidental revisions in the basic antitrust statutes.
"'For a clear statement of the issues, see Vernon, Antitrust and InternationalBusiness,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1968, at 78, and Ball, Cosmocorp: the Importance of Being
Stateless, I I COLUM. J.WORLD Bus. 25 (1967).
"Cf Bloom, Productivity: Weak Link in our Economy, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
197 1, at 4.
"See Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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The main premise underlying what I have chosen to call the new
antitrust challenge is that corporate enterprise, and perforce the market
economy it dominates, has undergone such radical change that traditional
antitrust policy has in whole or important part been rendered obsolete.
The conclusion logically follows that the policy should be radically
revamped or possibly discarded altogether and a more appropriate
instrument be designed to take its place. The evidence offered to support
the premise, from which the challenge flows, is that corporations have
now attained such enormous size and market power that they in fact
control those market forces which antitrust policy proposes to maintain in
a sufficiently viable state to control. I should now like to turn to the
conclusiveness of the economic evidence on which the challenge rests.
III.

THE EVIDENCE

First, on the issue of business size the facts cited by Galbraith and
others speak eloquently for themselves. It is perfectly obvious that the
giant corporations of a half-century ago were no more than one-tenth the
size of the giants today. Also, there is fairly persuasive evidence that
significant changes in managerial techniques have been a concomitant of
the greatly increased size. In truth, if managerial techniques have not
undergone substantial change over this period the intensified efforts of
graduate schools of business administration to instruct the future captains
of industry in the skill of scientific management must be written off as a
futile and extremely expensive exercise. However, that corporations have
attained great size and are managed more professionally-even if
planning is a crucial part of the new professionalism-is scarcely relevant
to the issue of whether the market economy is more or less viable than it
once was. Careful statistical analysis may very well reveal that firms
possessing substantial market power are often large, but it cannot be
inferred from this that the larger the firm the more market power it
possesses. The two are distinctly different phenomena. Similarly, there is
no clear presumption that the emergence of scientific management has
somehow emancipated its practitioners from the constraining forces of the
market economy. Because modern managers "plan"--as they allegedly
do-it does not follow that they attain greater control over those forces
external to the companies they manage. For example, we may have every
confidence that the Ford Motor Company planned the Edsel, and that the
Kellogg Company planned its cereals with freeze-dried fruits. We may be
equally confident that in neither case were the results a part of the plan.
Moreover, in emphasizing the simple statistics on corporate size
those who challenge the relevance of antitrust greatly exaggerate the role
of bigness in the economy. While the present day large corporation is ten
times the size of its early twentieth century counterpart, the total economy
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is larger by almost the same multiple. Considerable interest has centered
on the position of the largest one hundred or largest two hundred
manufacturing corporations in the United States economy, an interest
that has generated a steady outpouring of statistics on aggregate levels of
concentration.12 The conclusions they support depend importantly on the
measure used and on who does the measuring. Morris Adelman found
that between 1933 and 1960 the share of all manufacturing corporate
assets controlled by the 117 largest corporations actually declined from
45.6 per cent to 44.6 per cent.43 Gardiner Means, using a different method
of measurement, calculated that the one hundred largest manufacturing
corporations controlled forty per cent of all manufacturing corporate
assets in 1929 and forty-nine per cent in 1962;11 Means assigned to the
largest one hundred corporations the assets of all subsidiaries in which
they held at least a fifty per cent common stock interest. A recent Federal
Trade Commission report shows that the largest one hundred
manufacturing corporations increased their share of total corporate assets
from 36.1 per cent to 49.3 per cent between 1925 and 1968, but from only
44.2 per cent to 46.2 per cent between 1933 and 1962.45 The share of the
two hundred largest manufacturing corporations rose from 47.7 per cent
in 1929 to fifty-six per cent in 1962, and to 60.9 per cent in 1968.
It cannot be conclusively determined from these data whether the
shares of the one hundred largest or two hundred largest corporations of
the total domestic economy have actually changed since the 1920's. Assets
are only one of several possible measures of the relative importance of a
given number of firms, and for this purpose is a less desirable measure
than "value added in manufacture" - a census of manufactures concept.
It is known that the largest corporations tend to be more capital intensive
than other corporations, and hence have a larger share of the
manufacturing economy's assets than of other of its activities such as
"value added" on employment. 6 It is possible, therefore, that a portion of
the increase in the share of total corporate assets accounted for by the
largest one hundred corporations between 1925 and 1968 simply means
that these corporations have grown more capital intensive than all other
corporations. Moreover, the assets attributed to these companies include
2

For an excellent summary of the statistical findings and the merits and defects of
particular methods of measuring aggregate concentration, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 39-44 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
SCHERER].
3

' Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 236, 239

(1964).
"Id. at 15-19, 281-324.
s"Economic Report on Corporate Mergers," supra note 14, at 173.
"SCHERER at 40.
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those of their foreign subsidiaries. As Scherer has observed ".

.

. it is

conceivable that a substantial fraction of the apparent growth of the 100
largest firms' share of all manufacturing assets reflects those firms'
expanding position in foreign markets . . .-47 For example, his
calculations show that in 1963 the largest one hundred manufacturing
corporations accounted for only thirty-six per cent of total domestic
manufacturing assets, while the Federal Trade Commission data show
that in the same year they accounted for 46.5 per cent of all
manufacturing assets. Even without these qualifications, it is clear that
large corporations have not increased their relative importance in the
economy by even a significant fraction of the increase they have registered
in their absolute size-the increase to which Galbraith and Berle assign
such critical importance. With these qualifications, we cannot be certain
that their share of total economic activity has changed measurably over
the past fifty years.
The important issue, however, and one far more pertinent to the
viability of antitrust policy, is whether the market power of large
corporations has increased so dramatically and become so irremediable
that a national policy of maintaining competition is a futile gesture. Those
economists who have analyzed the relevant quantitative data on market
structure are in virtual unanimous agreement that, on the average,
markets are certainly no more monopolistic, and are probably less
monopolistic, now than they were at the turn of the century. The
conclusion can be stated in no more precise terms because the standard
measures of monopoly are themselves imprecise, and for the long period
1899 to 1935 the factual evidence is incomplete.
The measure most widely used as a proxy for monopoly power is the
concentration ratio, the percentage of total industry sales, assets,
employment or "value added" accounted for by the four largest firms in
each of the Census of Manufactures four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification industries. The only study of market concentration from
1899 up to 1935 shows that over this period the share of total "value
added" for manufacturing produced in industries having concentration
ratios equal to or greater than fifty declined from 32.9 per cent to twentyfour per cent.48 Because of the broad industry definitions used and
deficiencies in the data the resulting calculations can best be described as
reasonable estimates. A much more refined analysis based on more recent
data shows that the shares of manufacturing value added originating in
industries with concentration ratios equal to or greater than fifty were as
49
follows:
1td. at 44.

41W.

NUTTER, THE EXTENT

1935 (1952).
"ScHERER at 62.
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TABLE I

CONCENTRATION IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY,
1947, 1963 and 1967

No. Industries

Concentration Index*

1947

1963

1967

No. Per Cent

No. Per Cent

No. Per Cent

80 - 100

31

7

25

6

23

6

60 -

79

65

15

48

12

56

14

40 -

59

104

24

91

22

88

21

20 - 39

152

35

159

38

165

40

81

19

91

22

79

19

433

100

414

100

411

100

1 -

19

* 4.digit S.I.C. basis.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, Part 1, (Washington, 1970).
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1947
24.4 per cent
1954
29.9 per cent
1958
30.2 per cent
1963
33.1 per cent
1966
28.6 per cent
While the changes in the "extent of monopoly" from one census year to
the next are evident, on balance there was no discernible upward trend
throughout the entire twentieth century.
Nor is monopoly, or more accurately, highly concentrated oligopoly,
anywhere nearly as pervasive as those who have challenged the viability of
antitrust would have us believe. A frequency distribution of concentration
indexes for selected postwar census years is shown in Table I. It will be
noted that in all years more than half the industries have concentration
ratios smaller than forty, that is, in over half the more than four hundred
industries the four largest firms account for less than forty per cent of the
total value added in their respective industries. In no more than one-fifth
of the industries do the largest four account for as much as sixty per cent
of total value added, in only six per cent do they account for as much as
eighty per cent. The distribution of concentration ratios has remained
fairly stable over the twenty-year period, demonstrating no perceptible
trend. Market power, as that term is generally construed, obviously exists,
but it is perfectly clear that the large corporation does not
characteristically control the markets in which it operates.
These data merit additional comment in terms of their pertinence to
the alleged ability of large corporations to manage the demand for their
products through advertising-an important aspect of both Berle's and
Galbraith's thesis. The concentration indexes show that each firm
typically competes with at least a half-dozen rivals, usually significantly
more, in each market in which it sells. Many of these rivals are also large
corporations. Since a gain for one means a loss to the others, it is quite
evident that all cannot simultaneously control demand through
advertising. What is one rival's success is another's failure. Furthermore,
if as Galbraith contends, affluent consumers "can be persuaded as
between an electric razor and an electric toothbrush," the calculated
concentration ratios considerably understate the number of competitors
with which each corporation must vie for consumer patronage; the
producer of electric razors not only competes with other electric razor
producers, but also with producers of electric toothbrushes, tape
recorders, phonograph records, and a host of other consumer products
and services-including possibly an evening at the theater. In a society
where consumer demands respond to persuasion rather than need, all
consumer products are in some sense in competition with each other, and
the market control held by any one firm is decidedly less than what we
might infer from its share of a particular four-digit industry.
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We turn now to the issue of whether antitrust is a charade-an
institution that protects the very monopoly power it purports to attack.
There is no disputing the fact that anti-merger policy has been
administered much more vigorously in recent years than at any time prior
to 1950. As a consequence, some firms who would seek to attain the size of
their larger rivals through merger are denied this once open avenue of
growth. The courts are aware that Clayton Act Section 7 denies to some
corporations the opportunity to grow through merger to the size of their
largest rival, and have spoken in unmistakably clear language why this
denial is essential for the preservation of competition. As Judge Weinfeld
stated it in his Bethlehem opinion:
If there is logic to the defendants' contention that their joinder is
justified to enable them, in their own language, to offer
'challenging competition to United States Steel . . . which
exercises dominant influence over competitive conditions in the
steel industry . . .' then the remaining large producers in the 'Big
12' could with equal logic urge that they, too, be permitted to join
forces . . . in order to give more effective competition to the
enhanced 'Big 2'; and so we reach a point of more intense
concentration in an industry already highly concentrated-indeed
we head in the direction of triopoly.0
However, because the recently strengthened antimerger policy denies
to the second, third, or even sixth largest competitor those mergers the
largest firm once consummated with impunity, it scarcely follows that the
policy protects the large firms with market power from those seeking to
share it with them. With a few notable exceptions, the mergers recently
challenged under Section 7 have been those in which the acquiring firm
already had a substantial share of the relevant market and, in general,
were precisely those large corporations Galbraith contends the law
protects. According to Mueller, sixty-two per cent of the corporations
having $1 billion or more in assets and one-third of the largest two
hundred corporations have been subjects of antimerger complaints. 5"
Nearly all merger complaints have been confined to the largest five
hundred corporations. At the other end of the size spectrum hundreds,
sometimes thousands, of small mergers take place annually and go
unchallenged. Between 1959 and 1968 the Federal Trade Commission
recorded 11,242 mergers and acquisitions in mining and manufacturing
alone, and an additional 3,827 in trade and services.52 In less than ten per
cent of these recorded mergers and acquisitions did the acquired firm have
'*United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (1958).
"Statement of Willard F. Mueller in Planning,Regulation and Competition at 25.
' 2"Economic Report on Corporate Mergers," supra note 14, at 665, 677.
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assets of $10 million or more. The antitrust agencies challenged perhaps
two per centO of the slightly more than fifteen thousand mergers and
acquisitions. It is obvious, therefore, that antimerger policy is not directed
against small and medium-size companies to protect the large. Small
mergers that go unchallenged are a daily occurrence.
As to the remaining component of the charade, namely, that antitrust
permits the informal price fixing of highly concentrated oligopolies while
it attacks the more formal price-fixing arrangements of the more
competitive sector, the evidence neither decisively supports nor refutes the
contention. In their analysis of the relationship between the number of
price-fixing cases resulting in criminal penalties and industry
concentration, Clabault and Burton found a weak inverse relationship
between the two.54 The eighty-five per cent of the industries with
concentration indexes of less than sixty accounted for ninety-four per cent
of the cases, whereas the fifteen per cent of the industries with higher
concentration ratios accounted for six per cent of the cases. These data
lend themselves to several alternative interpretations. They suggest the
possibility that highly concentrated industries in fact do, as Galbraith
asserts, rely relatively more on informal price fixing, and that these
arrangements are less often prosecuted. They also suggest the possibility
that corporations with market power, conceivably because of their
extensive legal resources and past antitrust experience, more assiduously
avoid interfirm agreements and trade association activities that could be
construed as conspirational. In any case the data clearly do not support
the contention that price fixing in highly concentrated industries is
virtually immune from persecution under the Sherman Act.
In sum, the reasoning underlying the recent antitrust challenge is
logically faulty and inconsonant with the facts. That reasoning may be
stated syllogistically as follows:
Major premise: All large corporations possess unremediable
market power.
Minor premise: Many corporations have grown large.
Conclusion: Many corporations possess unremediable market
power.
The major premise, and hence the conclusion, is untenable. Not only are
corporate size and market power logically different and the one
distinguishable from the other, the statistical facts clearly show that their
5lThe Department of Justice and The Federal Trade Commission actually issued a total
of only 207 Section 7 civil actions and complaints in the period 1956-1968, but some involved
multiple acquisitions.
' J. CLABAULT & J. BURTON, JR., SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS, 1955-1965: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

130 (1966).
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longrun trends move independently: the enormous increases registered in
absolute corporate size in the twentieth century have not been
accompanied by any discernible increase in the average level of market
concentration. Nor has the growth in absolute size been accompanied by
even a pronounced upward trend in aggregate concentration. The largest
one hundred or two hundred corporations account for approximately the
same proportion of total domestic economic activity now as they did in
the 1920's. However, it is the behavior of market concentration that is
relevant to the issue of whether antitrust policy is an appropriate and
effective means of social control of industry. That the average level of
market concentration has remained at approximately 1899 levels in the
face of developing technological imperatives and similar sweeping changes
in the economic environment and business methods surely attests to its
continuing appropriateness, and even to its past effectiveness.
Finally, the analysis of any policy leads eventually to an evaluation of
feasible alternatives. Those who have challenged antitrust policy on the
grounds that it is no longer relevant to modern corporate enterprise have
not always made it clear precisely what they would substitute in its place;
however, Galbraith has proposed direct regulation in the form of price
and wage controls as the most likely alternative. The substitution of direct
regulation for antitrust where workable competition has been patently
unattainable is, of course, consistent with historical precedent. While a
variety of economic and political factors entered into the creation of our
familiar regulatory agencies, by far the most important was that the
industries made subject to their jurisdiction were perceived to be
"natural" monopolies.
One scarcely needs to adumbrate the generally uninspiring historical
record of direct regulation to support the conclusion that any further
substitution of this means of control for antitrust at this stage of our
economic development would be at best misguided, at worst, folly. In a
penetrating recent analysis of this issue Donald Turner was prompted to
observe that ". . . it is by no means frivolous to ask whether direct
control over entry, rates and service . . . is really worth the effort." 55 He
admits to his doubts that the entire direct regulatory apparatus could, or
should, be scrapped, but he makes a persuasive case for enlarging the
scope of antitrust in the regulated industries, to be accommodated by a
commensurate contraction in direct regulation. Others, examining
essentially the same record, have dealt with the direct regulatory
apparatus less generously and urged that it be dismantled altogether. 51In
55D. TURNER, The Scope of Antitrust in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: IN HONOR OF E.S. MASON 89 (J.
Markham & G. Papanek ed. 1970).
'Posner, NaturalMonopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969).
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the face of such persuasive arguments to the contrary, one would be
extremely hard pressed to make a case for the wholesale substitution of
direct regulation for antitrust Galbraith prescribes.

IV.

PROPOSALS FOR RADICAL CHANGE

Recent proposals for radical57 change in antitrust policy derive from
essentially the same diagnosis of the market economy as do those
proposals that it be discarded altogether and replaced by another policy;
namely, large corporations in highly concentrated oligopolies possess a
degree of market power inconsistent with a public policy purporting to
maintain effective competition. The debate, therefore, begins with the
prescribed remedies. Those who challenge the appropriateness of antitrust
policy make their case on the proposition that concentrated oligopolies
are a consequence of immutable economic forces. Those who propose a
radically changed antitrust policy perceive concentrated oligopoly not
only as mutable but as remediable.
The most comprehensive of the recent recommendations for radical
change is 'the proposed Concentrated Industries Act set forth in the
Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy submitted to
the President in 1968.58 The proposed act would provide for the
dismantling of highly concentrated oligopolies, the erection of an absolute
prohibition on the acquisition of one of the leading firms in a concentrated
industry by a very large firm, an improvement in the quality and
availability of economic and financial data relevant to antitrust policy, a
removal of features in the Robinson-Patman Act that unduly restrict
competitive forces, and more liberal licensing of patents. Variants of these
proposals have been made from time to time by others,"' but I shall limit
my discussion here to the more far-reaching proposals of the
Concentrated Industries Act, specifically those for reducing oligopoly.
The proposed act provides a rule for divestiture of oligopoly firms
having as much as fifteen per cent of any market in which the four largest
firms have accounted for as much as seventy per cent of the market in at
least seven of the ten most recent years and four of the five most recent
rThe term "radical" is used in its literal sense as denoting a substantial departure from
the usual or traditional. Accordingly, I am not concerned here with proposals for modest
changes in antitrust policy such as, for example, those urging more temperate enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
WThe full text of the report of the task force, headed by Dean Phil C. Neal; appears on
115 CONG. REc. 13,890 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Neal Report] and in J. REPRINTS
FOR ANTITRUST L. AND ECON., Winter 1969, at 633.
5
9Cf. testimony of Walter Adams in Hearingson Concentration,supra note 42, at 24862, in which he proposes a holding company act to curtail conglomerate bigness. See also C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 44 (1959).
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years, provided that the combined market share of the four largest firms
in the most recent five-year period is at least eighty per cent of their
combined share in the immediately preceding five-year period, and
provided further that aggregate sales in the market have amounted to as
much as $500 million in four of the past five years."0 When these
conditions are met, divestiture of individual firms will proceed until no
single firm has more than a twelve per cent market share.
A confluence of circumstances are offered in support of the proposal:
(1) highly concentrated oligopolies can reap the rewards of monopoly
without entering into formal agreements; since antitrust policy cannot
reach the anticompetitive behavior, appropriate relief must be sought
through structural reorganization; (2) while Section 7 of the Clayton Act
provides strong protection against the growth of new concentration, the
Sherman Act has not yet proved effective in dealing with existing
concentration; a gap of major significance therefore needs to be closed; (3)
competitive pressures cannot be relied upon to erode the high level of
concentration that persists in numerous important industries; and (4) it is
virtually impossible to gather all the data relevant to any particular
oligopoly, and the best of judges could not be expected properly to take all
such data into account; hence, a set of rules is superior to the traditional
case by case approach. According to the Task Force's estimates, the
proposed act would require divestiture of the largest firms in industries
that in 1963 accounted for about fifteen per cent of the manufacturing
economy, including such major industries as motor vehicles, flat glass,
synthetic fibers, aircraft, organic chemicals, soap and detergents, and
many others. 6'
Most students of antitrust would agree that highly concentrated
oligopolies often behave as monopolies. The outpouring of industry
studies following the temporary National Economic Committee Hearings
of the 1930's contains abundant factual evidence that in highly
concentrated markets rivals tend to avoid overt price competition and to
substitute in its place business strategies of questionable benefit to the
public. Those same studies also show that, in general, their profits tend to
be higher than less concentrated industries. But this same outpouring of
industry studies also points clearly to the conclusion that industries having
similar structural characteristics often demonstrate vastly different
patterns of rivalrous conduct. Stated another way, the concentration ratio
that leads to a stifling of socially beneficial competition in one industry
often turns out to be numerically quite different from that required to
produce the same result in another. This fact alone, a fact that the Task
"The Neal Report at 13,897-98.
111d. at 13,892-93.
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Force readily acknowledges, calls into serious question the advisability of
attempting to solve the oligopoly problem by means of a rigid structural
rule, even such a carefully considered rule as that proposed in the Task
Force report.
The enormous difficulties attending the application of the proposed
rule can best be illustrated by reference to Table II, where are listed the
four-digit industries having concentration indexes of seventy or more in
1963.62 Since concentration ratios are not computed each year all the
criteria set forth in the Task Force's proposed rule could not be applied in
compiling the list, but most of the industries it contains would be likely
candidates for dissolution. The list provides some surprises. For example,
it includes such industries as "carbon black," "tobacco stemming and
redrying," "petroleum and coal products," but does not include such
important oligopolies as petroleum refining, basic steel or heavy electrical
equipment other than steam turbines. Additional refinement would very
likely reduce the list's anomalies, but it is clear that a rigorous application
of the proposed rule would reach some dubious candidates while falling
lightly upon industrial sectors generally regarded as constituting the
oligopolistic core of the American economy. However, it would catch
such prominent oligopolies as motor vehicles and parts, cellulosic manmade fibers, primary copper, lead and aluminum, steam engines and
turbines, aircraft propellers, cigarettes and chewing gum.
Of more critical importance, however, some of those oligopolies
destined for dissolution under the proposed rule, as examination of
detailed case studies reveals, demonstrate strikingly different patterns of
competitive behavior, ranging from a display of undeviating patterns of
3
conjectural interdependence to reasonably effective price competition.
To pursue a purely structural standard that completely disregards these
behavioral differences would be procrustean and needlessly
indiscriminate.
It does not follow from this that structural remedies are neither
necessary nor desirable. Distinguished antitrust authorities have long
reminded us that effective administration of the Sherman Act and Section
7 of the Clayton Act contemplates dissolution or divestiture, as the case
requires. And a persuasive case can be made that structural remedies have
been used too sparingly. The logical defect in such simplistic rules for
dissolution as that proposed in the Neal Report is not that it would call
"For a more extended analysis of these difficulties, see Markham, Structure Versus
Conduct in Antitrust, in ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 102 (W. SICHEL ed.
1970).
arThe cigarette and synthetic fiber industries are cases in point. Cf W. NICHOLLS, PRICE
POLICIES IN THE CIGARETrE INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY (1952).

(1951); J.

MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON
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TABLE II

Industry
Cereal Preparations
Blended and Prepared Flour
Wet Corn Milling
Chocolate and Cocoa Products
Chewing Gum
Cigarettes
Tire Cord and Fabric Industry
Pressed and Molded Pulp Goods
Industrial Gases
Cyclic (Coal Tar) Crudes
Cellulosic Man-Made Fibers
Organic Fibers, Noncellulosic
Soap and other Detergents
Explosives
Carbon Black
Petroleum and Coal Products, N.E.C.
Tires and Inner Tubes
Reclaimed Rubber
Flat Glass
Gypsum Products
Electrometallurgical Products
Primary Copper
Primrary Lead
Primary Aluminum
Nonferrous Forgings
Metal Cans
Steam Engines and Turbines
Typewriters
Carbon and Graphite Products
Household Refrigerators
Household Laundry Equipment
Household Vacuum cleaners
Sewing Machines
Electric Lamps
Telephone-Telegraph Apparatus
Electron Tubes, Receiving Type
Cathode Ray Picture Tubes
Primary Batteries, Dry and Wet
Motor Vehicles and Parts
Aircraft Propellers and Parts
Locomotives and Parts
Hard Surface Floor Coverings
Matches
Tobacco Stemming and Redrying

VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
(Per cent accounted
by four largest
companies)
86
70
71
75
90
80
79
72
72
(D)
82
94
72
72
72
70
70
93
94
84
79
85
(D)
(D)
84
74
93
76
83
74
78
81
(D)
92
92
87
91
89
84
(D)
97
87
71
70

(D) = Withheld to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies.
Source: Compiled from Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing industry 1963, Part I. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce (1966).
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for dissolution in some several dozen industries, but that it rests on the
assumption that, where antitrust remedies are concerned, what is
appropriate for, say, the carbon black industry is appropriate for all
industries of similar structure. The highly disparate patterns of
competitive behavior found among industries having very nearly the same
concentration ratios would seem to argue strongly that these indicia of
monopoly should be weighed heavily in dissolution suits, if for no other
reason than that doing so would enhance the efficient use of antitrust
resources; it would surely be more promotive of competition to dissolve
structural oligopolies that behave as oligopolies than to launch an
indiscriminate dissolution program against all the forty or more industries
having concentration ratios equal to or greater than seventy.
V.

THE CONTROVERSY RE-EXAMINED: A SUMMARY

This analysis of the current antitrust debate opened on the note that
the substantive content of the antitrust laws has endured with only modest
change for more than half a century. The legislative changes which have
been enacted, such as the Robinson-Patman Act and amended Section 7,
were reflective more of renewed emphasis than the need for new
substantive law to deal more effectively with sweeping economic change.
Antitrust proponents and antagonists alike now urge that this historical
continuity be broken, and for essentially the same reason but with
radically different consequences. Both have, with relatively minor
differences in emphasis, looked upon the giant corporations and highly
concentrated oligopolies visible on the economic scene andfjudged them to
be incompatible with our antitrust policy as presently framed. One school
of thought sees these as a product of immutable economic and social
forces and proposes that antitrust policy be discarded in favor of a more
promising, as yet unspecified, institution of public control. The other
proposes the enactment of legislation that, in a single stroke, defines
concentrated oligopolies as unlawful, and calls for their dissolution as
essential to the preservation of antitrust policy itself, and of the market
economy it purports to govern.
The challengers of antitrust clearly have not made their case. The
relevant data on the American economy convincingly support the
hypothesis that, in spite of enormous growth in corporate size, the average
market remains as competitively structured as it was shortly after the
enactment of the Sherman Act. There is therefore no evidence that the
growth in corporate size has made the market economy less viable, or
antitrust policy less pertinent. Nor is there any evidence, as their
antagonists assert, that the antitrust laws provide a shield for those in
possession of market power against their lesser rivals seeking to share it.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and we may reasonably assume the
Sherman Act as well, have been applied primarily against large firms with
market power attempting to increase it by merger. The case for rejecting
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antitrust is made even less persuasive in the absence of any clearly
workable alternative to substitute in its place.
The arguments by those who defend antitrust policy but propose that
it be radically altered deserve to be taken more seriously. Few would deny
that the market economy contains highly concentrated oligopolies, or that
this structural condition is often the most important source of
anticompetitive behavior. Nor would many hold, on the basis of available
factual evidence, that highly concentrated oligopoly is an inevitable
consequence of technological imperatives or similar immutable economic
forces. Many such oligopolies are, after all, a product of past mergers, and
in'those instances where they have been subjected to dissolution the feared
dislocations can be said to have been greatly exaggerated. Dissolution,
then is clearly an appropriate remedy for intolerable monopoly power,
whether that power is exercised independently by one firm or jointly by
several.
However, having acknowledged that dissolution of highly
concentrated oligopolies may reduce the present inconsistency between
antitrust in theory and antitrust in practice, the critical issue of by what
process this inconsistency is removed remains. Those who call for radical
change urge that this be accomplished through the application of a rigid
structural formula-a formula which imputes to concentration ratios of a
specified magnitude greater predictive capabilities than is supported by
either economic theory or empirical studies of oligopolistic industries. It
may very well be that the time has arrived for Congress to assert again
that the Sherman Act, as it now stands, was originally designed to arrest
all monopoly that threatens unreasonably to impair the effective
functioning of competitive market forces. In doing so, it would arm the
Department of Justice and the courts with a reaffirmation of
congressional intent both appear to need. This is essentially what
Congress did for merger policy in amending Clayton Act Section 7, and
without resort to rigid formulas but with manifest results. Such an
approach would have most of the advantages, and none of the
disadvantages, of dissolution by inflexible rules. It would also preserve, to
repeat Chief Justice Hughes observation referred to earlier, the Sherman
Act as a charter of freedom having "the generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It
does not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to
legitimate enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by
providing loopholes for escape."" Until those who challenge antitrust
policy as outmoded, or those who propose that it be made more effective
through radical change, make a much stronger case, these features merit
preserving.
"Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).

